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In multi-attribute choice, decision makers use decision strategies to arrive at the final
choice. What are the neural mechanisms underlying decision strategy selection? The
first goal of this paper is to provide a literature review on the neural underpinnings and
cognitivemodels of decision strategy selection and thus set the stage for a neurocognitive
model of this process. The second goal is to outline such a unifying, mechanistic model
that can explain the impact of noncognitive factors (e.g., affect, stress) on strategy
selection. To this end, we review the evidence for the factors influencing strategy
selection, the neural basis of strategy use and the cognitive models of this process.
We also present the Bottom-Up Model of Strategy Selection (BUMSS). The model
assumes that the use of the rational Weighted Additive strategy and the boundedly
rational heuristic Take The Best can be explained by one unifying, neurophysiologically
plausible mechanism, based on the interaction of the frontoparietal network, orbitofrontal
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and the brainstem nucleus locus coeruleus. According
to BUMSS, there are three processes that form the bottom-up mechanism of decision
strategy selection and lead to the final choice: (1) cue weight computation, (2) gain
modulation, and (3) weighted additive evaluation of alternatives. We discuss how these
processes might be implemented in the brain, and how this knowledge allows us to
formulate novel predictions linking strategy use and neural signals.
Keywords: strategy selection, multi-attribute choice, decision-making, neurocognitive model, arousal, gain
modulation
Adaptive decision making requires processing of information from various sources. Do we
integrate multiple decision cues or process them selectively? The use of various strategies of cue
processing helps us make decisions flexibly, sometimes extensively analyzing information, and
simplifying the decision process at other times. What are the neural mechanisms of decision
strategy selection? Can we explain the impact of emotional factors on strategy use by understanding
its neural underpinnings? The first goal of this paper is to provide a literature review on the
models and neural correlates of decision strategy selection and thus set the stage for a unifying
neurocognitive model of this process. The second goal is to outline such a model, that is able to
explain affective influences on strategy selection.
In multi-attribute choice, people decide which alternative they choose out of several available
choice alternatives, after they judge the alternatives on one or more attributes (or cues). This
kind of choice tasks may be further divided into preferential choices and probabilistic inferences
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(Payne et al., 1993; Gigerenzer et al., 1999). In preferential
choices, the criterion that the individuals maximize is
subjective—for example, a person might decide between
two dishes in a restaurant, imagining how tasty they are. In
contrast, choices based on probabilistic inference deal with
objective criterion values. For example, paramedics may use
several decision cues to infer and decide which patient must
be treated first in an accident, or stock brokers might decide in
which stocks to invest after analyzing companies’ performance
over the previous year. The cues are probabilistically related
to the criterion, so a positive cue value makes a positive
criterion more likely. Multi-attribute choices require a relatively
long sequence of cognitive operations. Classical theories of
choice postulated that when making such choices, humans
should process all available information, carefully weighing
the attributes, multiplying the weights by the attribute values
and adding the products of this multiplication in order to
arrive at alternatives’ overall judgment which then can be
compared (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993). This has been known
as the weighted additive (WADD) model (Payne et al., 1993).
As alternatives to this normative view, descriptive approaches
stress that people frequently use heuristics to simplify decision
problems (Payne et al., 1993; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Table 1). A
lexicographic strategy Take The Best (TTB) is a flagship example
of simple heuristics for multi-attribute choice. It infers that when
comparing two alternatives, the one with the highest value on
the most valid attribute is selected as the one with the highest
criterion value. If the cue with the highest validity does not
discriminate, then Take The Best considers the cue with the
second highest validity, and so on (Gigerenzer and Goldstein,
1996).
Choice strategies differ in the effort to execute them. For
example, WADD always processes all available decision cues and
multiplies their values by their weights. Strategies like WADD
integrate information into alternatives’ overall judgments. These
strategies are called compensatory, because low values on one
attribute can be compensated by high values on other attributes
(Dawes and Corrigan, 1974). In turn, simple strategies like
TTB do not integrate information—their decisions are based
on a single cue, the rest of the information is ignored. Such
strategies are thus called noncompensatory, because values of
the less important cues cannot compensate for the cue value of
the most important cue (Einhorn, 1970). Given their simplicity,
simple heuristics have been proposed as plausible models of
predecisional information processing and choice (Payne et al.,
1993; Gigerenzer et al., 1999).
FACTORS INFLUENCING STRATEGY USE
Strategy use is influenced by various dispositional and situational
factors. Early studies identified that learning related factors—
expertise, training, and prior knowledge of the decision
problem—impact predecisional information search and strategy
use (Zakay, 1990; Shanteau, 1992; for recent work see Pachur
and Marinello, 2013). Later, interest grew in the relation
between strategy use and motivational characteristics such as
need for cognitive closure (Shiloh et al., 2001; Vermeir et al.,
2002), need for cognition (Verplanken, 1993), decisiveness and
indecisiveness (Ferrari and Dovidio, 2001; Anderson, 2003).
Also, cognitive ability was found to impact strategy selection
(Bröder, 2003; Fasolo et al., 2003; Mata et al., 2007, 2010).
Numerous task and context determinants of predecisional
information processing and strategy use studied so far include
framing of a decision task (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981),
response mode (Tversky et al., 1988), type of learning task
(Pachur and Olsson, 2012), information cost and information
format (Bröder, 2000; Newell and Shanks, 2003); task complexity
(Payne, 1976), time pressure (Wright, 1974; Rieskamp and
Hoffrage, 1999), and many others (for overviews see Payne et al.,
1993; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011).
Notably, very few studies looked at how emotional factors
influence predecisional information processing and strategy use.
Mano (1992) reported that participants under social stress were
more extreme in their judgments of job applicants, suggesting
that they may have focused on only a subset of the presented
information. Similarly, Lewinsohn andMano (1993) showed that
highly aroused participants acquired less information and did
so in a more selective manner by focusing more on subjectively
important attributes. Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2015)
looked at how positive and negative mood states impact strategy
selection, assuming that positive mood broadens the attention
focus and negative mood narrows it. In line with this assumption
they found that positive mood led to the more frequent use of
compensatory strategies, whereas negative mood led to the more
frequent use of simple noncompensatory heuristics. Wichary
et al. (2015a) looked at how emotional arousal impacts the use
of decision strategies. In that study, we used skin conductance
as an index of autonomic arousal induced by the aversive and
neutral pictures, in order to better control participants’ state and
to gain some insight into the neural correlates of predecisional
information processing. We found that our manipulation led to
reduced information search and increased allocation of attention
to the most important cue. We also found that emotional arousal
indexed by skin conductance leads to the use of simpler decision
strategies. This pattern of results favors the attention narrowing
hypothesis, which suggests that high arousal can lead to attention
narrowing and in consequence, to the reliance on simple decision
heuristics. The association of strategy use with skin conductance
is also a hint at the neural underpinnings of strategy use, both
peripheral and central. Our results indicate that the sympatho-
adrenergic-medullary system (SAM; Schommer et al., 2008) is
involved in decision processes under stress, as well as that
the central structures associated with SAM activity might be
involved, namely the anterior cingulate cortex (Critchley, 2005)
and the neuromodulatory noradrenergic system (Aston-Jones
and Cohen, 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011).
NEURAL UNDERPINNINGS OF DECISION
STRATEGY SELECTION
Insights into the neural mechanisms of strategy selection come
from a separate line of research within neuroscience. Studies on
multi-attribute choice have been reviewed by Krawczyk (2002);
Venkatraman and Huettel (2012) and Volz and Gigerenzer
(2012). These papers reviewed empirical evidence for the neural
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TABLE 1 | Decision strategies for multi-attribute choice with references to empirical studies.
Strategy Studies Description
Weighted additive WADD Payne et al., 1993 Choice alternatives (e.g., cars, houses) can be described by sets of attributes or
cues (e.g., color, price) which have values (e.g., red, blue or 10,000, 20,000 $) and
weights (subjectively or objectively predetermined attribute importance). Weighted
additive calculates for each alternative the sum of the attribute values multiplied by
the corresponding cue weights and selects the alternative with the highest score.
Equal weight; additive; unit weight ADD Dawes, 1979 Calculates for each alternative the sum of the cue values (multiplied by a weight
of 1) and selects the alternative with the highest score.
Elimination by aspects EBA Tversky, 1972 Eliminates all alternatives that do not exceed a specified value on the first cue
examined. If more than one alternative remains, another cue is considered. This
procedure is repeated until only one alternative is left. Each cue is selected with a
probability proportional to its weight.
Lexicographic model LEX Fishburn, 1974 Selects the alternative with the highest cue value on the cue with the highest
validity. If more than one alternative has the same highest cue value, then for these
alternatives the cue with the second highest validity is considered, and so on.
Lexicographic semiorder LEX-SEMI Luce, 1956 Works like Lexicographic, with the additional assumption of a negligible difference.
Pairs of alternatives with a negligible difference between the cue values are not
discriminated.
Take The Best TTB Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996 A special case of Lexicographic for two alternatives with binary cue values (e.g.,
“rains today,” “does not rain today”). Cue validity can be used as cue weight in this
case—it is a conditional probability of the cue’s success in predicting the criterion
value (e.g., predicting if it will rain tomorrow based on today’s weather) given that
the cue discriminates among the alternatives (alterantives do not have the same
cue values).
mechanisms of multi-attribute choice, however they did not
focus on strategy use. Here, we focus on the use of compensatory
and noncompensatory strategies, in situations when both kinds
of strategies can be used, that is when knowledge beyond option
recognition is available. Therefore, we did not include studies
on the recognition heuristic by Volz et al. (2006) and Rosburg
et al. (2011), because these studies analyzed situations when only
recognition heuristic could be applied (or not) and did not look
at the problem of selecting a strategy from a broader repertoire.
Several studies have attempted to identify the underlying
neural sources of interindividual variability in strategy use.
Venkatraman et al. (2009a), studying choices under risk
using fMRI, showed that individual variability in the use
of compensatory and simplifying decision strategies could be
predicted by activity in ventral striatum, suggesting that high
activity in the dopaminergic system might underlie the tendency
to use the simplifying noncompensatory strategies. Moreover,
Venkatraman et al. (2009b) provided evidence that strategic
control of decisions is associated with the activity of anterior
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC, see also Venkatraman
and Huettel, 2012, for a review). Similarly, Gluth et al. (2013a),
studying inference based multi-attribute choice with fMRI,
showed the association between strategy selection and the activity
of ventral striatum, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the
anterior cingulate cortex. Khader et al. (2011) using a training
paradigm and fMRI recording during a memory-based multi-
attribute choice, showed that the amount of information that
was required to use in a decision was reflected by the activity
of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and this activity
modulated the activity in posterior areas associated with storage
of decision cues. Replicating and extending these findings,
Khader et al. (2015) showed that DLPFC activation is sensitive
to both the number of decision cues that is retrieved in a
controlled manner and the number of cues that are automatically
activated by a decision option, suggesting that DLPFC activation
reflects a general retrieval effort. Khader et al. (2011, 2015)
also found that activation in the parietal cortex increased as a
function the number of attributes to be retrieved. Together, these
findings constitute important evidence for the involvement of the
frontoparietal network in predecisional information processing.
COGNITIVE MODELS OF STRATEGY
SELECTION
The problem of using the right strategy for a particular decision
task is framed as the strategy selection problem and several models
have been proposed to account for this process (Table 2). The
earliest are Beach and Mitchell (1978), Christensen-Szalanski
(1978) and Payne et al.’s models (1988, 1993), which take a top-
down approach to strategy selection. Regardless the differences,
these models commonly assume that along with the repertoire of
strategies, decision makers possess a priori knowledge of the cost
and benefits of using a particular strategy, and integrating this
knowledge leads to a (presumably) conscious, deliberate choice
of a strategy. Strategy selection learning theory (SSL, Rieskamp
and Otto, 2006), like the previous models, assumes that people
possess a repertoire of strategies from which they can choose the
appropriate strategy. It postulates that reinforcement learning of
expectations of strategies’ performance is the main driving force
behind the tendency to use a particular strategy.
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TABLE 2 | Cognitive models of decision strategy selection.
Model Mechanism of selection Approach
Beach and Mitchell (1978), rule based model Selection based on cost-benefit calculations Top-down
Christensen-Szalanski (1978), rule based model Selection based on cost-benefit calculations Top-down
Payne et al. (1993), rule based model Effort-accuracy calculations Top-down
Strategy Selection Learning theory (SSL; Rieskamp and
Otto, 2006), reinforcement learning model
Reinforcement learning, updating of strategy expectancies Top-down
Lee and Cummins (2004), evidence accumulation model Sequential sampling of evidence; variable evidence threshold Bottom-up
Bergert and Nosofsky (2007), evidence accumulation
model
Sequential sampling of evidence with attribute weights as free parameters and final choice
as probabilistic
Bottom-up
Glöckner and Betsch (2008), connectionist model Activation of network nodes, weighted summing of activations; parallel constraint
satisfaction; network consistency compared to threshold
Bottom-up
Another model is Lee and Cummins’ Evidence Accumulation
Model (EAM, Lee and Cummins, 2004), which assumes that
both the rational decision strategy (RAT) and the fast and frugal
TTB strategy are special cases of a sequential sampling decision
process. Thus, it is a rather radical departure from the previous
models, because the assumption of the repertoire of strategies
is absent in this model. In turn, its main assumption is that
the TTB strategy and the rational strategy can be unified within
one process. Building on EAM, Bergert and Nosofsky (2007)
also proposed that TTB strategy and the rational model can
be unified within one framework. The crucial difference was
that Begert and Nosofsky relaxed several assumptions of the
earlier model in order to make it more psychologically plausible,
e.g., they assumed that decision makers do not always use the
optimal attribute weights and that the final choice is not made
deterministically, but rather in a probabilistic manner. Glöckner
and Betsch (2008) proposed a connectionist, parallel constraint
satisfaction model of predecisional information processing.
Similarly to the above models, their approach is also based on
a unifying mechanism. Their model proposes that probabilistic
decision tasks can be represented as simple neural networks
(Glöckner and Betsch, 2008). It assumes that the activation
spreading through such networks and eventually settling in a
balanced state is the underlying mechanism of choice. The settled
state of network activation represents the state of maximum
consistency, which is compared to a threshold, and when the
given threshold is exceeded, the choice is made.
In sum, the strategy selection problem was first approached
from the perspective of top-down models, assuming a repertoire
of strategies that are themselves selected by a meta-mechanism
that takes into account situational factors and decision maker’s
resources. Departures from this line of reasoning were bottom-
up models which attempted to explain the apparent variability in
strategy use with unifying mechanisms. Together, these models
offered some insights into the cognitive processes underlying
decisions. However, they did not offer any mechanistic
explanation of how the model parameters might be changed. In
other words, these models were not well grounded in theories
of elementary cognitive processes. This opens the way for
more explicit accounts of how strategy selection is shaped. We
believe that further unifiedmodels should be proposed, grounded
in empirical and theoretical work on attention, and in the
neurophysiological work on the neural substrates of attentional
processes. Since the evidence for the neural underpinnings of
strategy selection is growing, these models should be designed as
neurocognitive rather than purely cognitive models. Moreover,
since the evidence for the impact of emotions on strategy use
is also growing (e.g., Scheibehenne and von Helversen, 2015;
Wichary et al., 2015a) and neural theories of how emotions
impact cognition are available (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005;
Mather et al., 2015), such models should incorporate emotional
factors and their underlying neural substrates to fill the existing
gap in explanation of how emotions impact decision making.
TOWARD A NEUROCOGNITIVE MODEL OF
DECISION STRATEGY SELECTION
In the following sections, we present a neurocognitive model
of predecisional information processing and decision strategy
selection. In order to go beyond empirical data and to understand
the cognitive processes fully it is important to test mechanistic
process models that try to explicitly state the underlying
neurocognitive mechanisms (cf. Wichary et al., 2015b; Chuderski
and Smolen, 2016). Within the domain of strategy selection
in multi-attribute choice, there exists an empirical challenge
described by Newell (2005) that it is impossible to distinguish,
based on behavior, the accuracy of the unified and multiple
strategy models described in the previous section. Therefore, we
think it is time to build models of decision strategy selection
that can provide predictions that go beyond behavior and
that can be tested in neurophysiological studies. The need to
develop such models is also underlined by the fact that several
neurophysiological models of multi-attribute choice already exist
(Louie et al., 2013; Chau et al., 2014; Hunt et al., 2014; Tsetsos
et al., 2016). These models are relevant here, because they
stress the importance of brain-wide computational processes as
determinants of choice—particularly, the divisive normalization,
hierarchical inhibition and gain control processes. Our model
shares these computational principles and applies them to
strategy selection.
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Themodel, BUMSS (Bottom-UpModel of Strategy Selection),
is based on our previous attempts to understand strategy
selection in a unified, bottom-up manner (Smolen´ and Wichary,
2008; Wichary and Smolen´, 2013). In these early version, as well
as in the current version, the basic assumption is that in every
choice situation people attempt to compute a weighted additive
evaluation of decision alternatives. With this assumption, the
question arises how to shape this general underlying process
so that it resembles information processing with a simple
noncompensatory heuristic at times. The idea behind our model
is based on the observation by Martignon and Hoffrage (1999)
that the TTB heuristic is equivalent to the WADD rule with a
noncompensatory set of cue weights. A noncompensatory set of
cue weights is a J-shaped distribution of cue weights, where one
cue has a much higher weight than the other cues, such that the
sum of their weights is not higher than the weight of the best cue.
In contrast, a compensatory cue weight distribution is such that
the cue weights are similar, and the sum of the less valid cues is
higher than the weight of the best cue (Martignon and Hoffrage,
1999, 2002). In this perspective, themain question that ourmodel
tries to answer is how to obtain a noncompensatory set of cue
weights using neurally plausible computations.
To illustrate the problem, consider a two-alternative, six-
attribute choice task. The goal of the decision maker is to
choose the more expensive diamond from the set of two. Each
of the diamonds is described with six cues (attributes): size,
overall proportions of the diamond, crown proportions, pavilion
proportions, size of table and color (e.g., Mata et al., 2007). Each
cue has a utility. In studies on multi-attribute choice, utility of
a cue is often defined by the experimenter as cue validity—the
conditional probability that a choice based on this cue is correct,
given that the cue discriminates between the choice alternatives
(Rieskamp and Hoffrage, 1999; Martignon and Hoffrage, 2002).
There are many alternative measures that capture the utility
of a cue, e.g., bayesian validity (Lee and Cummins, 2004),
usefulness (Newell et al., 2003), success (Newell et al., 2004).
Also, subjectively, cue utility can be determined by the decision
maker through a host of reinforcement learning and memory
processes that reflect how well the cue performed in the past and
how relevant the cue is to the current goals set by the decision
task (e.g., Rakow et al., 2005). The different definitions of cue
utility and the processes that compute it are beyond the scope of
the current paper. However, in many experiments on inference
based multi-attribute choice, cue validity is explicitly given to the
participants as a number, and participants use this information
to guide their information acquisition and choice (e.g., Rieskamp
and Hoffrage, 1999, 2008; Bröder, 2000, 2003; Newell et al., 2003;
Newell and Shanks, 2003). In the current model, we stay with this
conceptualization and assume that cue validities (Q) are available
to the decision makers as the following numbers: 0.706 (size),
0.688 (overall proportions), 0.667 (crown proportions), 0.647
(pavilion proportions), 0.625 (size of table), and 0.6 (color). Each
cue takes one of the two values for each diamond: low (0) or high
(1) (see example in Table 3).
According to BUMSS, there are three processes that form the
bottom-up mechanism of decision strategy selection and lead to
the final choice: (1) cue weight computation, (2) gainmodulation,
TABLE 3 | Example of a multi-attribute choice task with validities, values,
and weights of the cues for low (5) and high (35) values of the inverse
temperature parameter β.
Cue
1 2 3 4 5 6
Cue validity 0.706 0.688 0.667 0.647 0.625 0.6
Cue values for alt. 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Cue values for alt. 2 0 1 0 1 0 1
Cue weight (β = 5) 0.211 0.193 0.174 0.157 0.141 0.124
Cue weight (β = 35) 0.501 0.267 0.128 0.063 0.029 0.012
and (3) weighted additive evaluation of alternatives (Figure 1).
BUMSS postulates that in order to choose one alternative from
several alternatives, the decision maker will first acquire and
then weigh available decision cues, according to the softmax rule
(Sutton and Barto, 1998; Doya, 2002), which is an example of
divisive normalization (Louie et al., 2013):
aj =
eβQj
∑k
i = 1 e
βQi
(1)
where aj is the weight of decision cues j, Qj is the cue validity of
cue j and β is the gain control parameter. The crucial parameter
in Equation (1), β (inverse temperature), reflects the changes in
neural gain (e.g., Doya, 2002; Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005).
In computational neuroscience terms, gain is the amplification
of neural activation, which is achieved by additional input
into a signal processing pathway and is usually expressed as
multiplication of the signal (Eldar et al., 2013; Louie et al., 2013).
According to Equation 1, changes in gain lead to the changes in
cue weighting (Figure 2). In our example, gain increase from 1 to
35 will transform the original cue validities (0.706, 0.688, 0.667,
0.647, 0.625, and 0.6) with a compensatory distribution into the
resulting cue weights (0.501, 0.267, 0.128, 0.063, 0.029, 0.012)
with a noncompensatory distribution (Table 3). Note that in our
example such a noncompensatory distribution is only obtained
with a very high value of β (35), whereas small values of β (1 or
5) lead to compensatory distributions of cue weights (Figure 2).
After acquiring and weighting the decision cues, the decision
maker will then attempt to evaluate decision alternatives by
integrating the weights and values of the decision cues, which is
described by the weighted additive rule:
Vj =
∑k
i = 1
ai ci,j (2)
where Vj is the value of a choice alternative j, ai is the cue
weight and ci,j is the value of ith cue for jth alternative. In our
example, the option values are V1 = 0.335, V2 = 0.474 for β = 5
and V1 = 0.513, V2 = 0.342 for β = 35, thus showing that
different values of β parameter can lead to qualitatively different
option evaluations. Finally, the decision maker will choose an
alternative j from several alternatives in a probabilistic manner,
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FIGURE 1 | Summary of the bottom-up model of strategy selection (BUMSS). Computations and brain structures postulated by BUMSS as the mechanism of
decision strategy selection and choice. For any multi-alternative, multi-attribute choice task, first, the attention weights (a) of the attributes are computed, by the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), on the basis of the initial cue validities (Q) (left panel). During this process, the phasic gain modulation
(change in β) mediated by locus coeruleus (LC) increases the attention weights of the most valid attribute while decreasing the weights of the other attributes. These
attention weights enter the option evaluation process (middle panel). For each option, its evaluation is computed as the summation of all attribute values multiplied by
their attention weights. This is computed by the frontoparietal network, consisting of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the parietal cortex (PC). Finally,
option evaluations determine the probabilities of choosing the options (right panel), a process performed by presupplementary motor area (preSMA). These
probabilities are also influenced by phasic gain modulation by LC. Gain modulation is affected by ACC activity, which is modulated, in turn, by affective context: pain,
effort, stress, and emotions.
with a probability dj that is given again by the softmax rule
(Sutton and Barto, 1998; Doya, 2002):
dj =
eVjβ∑o
i = 0 e
Viβ
(3)
where Vj is the value of alternative j, o is the number of options
and β is the same inverse temperature parameter as in (1) that
reflects the gain and in consequence, controls the stochasticity of
the choice. For increasing β , the probability that the alternative
with the highest value will be chosen, increases. For a choice
between two alternativesV1 andV2, this will be shown as changes
in the steepness of the well-known sigmoid function (Figure 2).
In our example, with the low values of β (in both Equations 1 and
3), the probabilities for alternative 1 and 2 will be equal to 0.333
and 0.667, respectively. With high values of β , the probabilities
will be equal to 0.997 and 0.003, respectively. Note the influence
of β on this stage. Although the absolute difference between the
values of the alternatives computed by Equation (2) was similar
in both cases (0.14 and 0.17) the probabilities of choice differ
substantially for different values of β .
HOW IS BUMSS IMPLEMENTED IN THE
BRAIN?
Apart from specifying the computational processes, the aim
of the current model is to propose a set of neural substrates
underlying choices consistent with WADD and TTB. We
postulate that the computational processes described above take
place in a brain network consisting of (1) the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and parietal cortex (PC)—which form
the fronto-parietal network (FPN) and are responsible for cue
weight computation and weighted additive evaluation, (2) the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), which contributes to cue weight
computation, (3) the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and (4) the
brainstem nucleus locus coeruleus (LC), which contribute to cue
weight computation and choice by modulating gain (Figure 1).
Fronto-parietal network, particularly its components the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the parietal cortex
(PC), performs the operations of maintaining and integrating
information necessary for current and future behavior and thus
is the neural substrate for working memory processes (Linden
et al., 2003; Erikson et al., 2015). Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
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FIGURE 2 | Cue weights computed from cue validities by Equation (1)
in BUMSS. In our example, the initial cue validities (Q): 0.706, 0.688, 0.667,
0.647, 0.625, 0.6 are transformed by the softmax rule into the cue weights (a).
With low values of the inverse temperature parameter β (1, 5), the resulting
cue weights have a compensatory distribution, similarly as the original cue
validities. With a high value of the β parameter (35), the initial compensatory
distribution of cue validities results in a noncompensatory distribution of cue
weights.
computes positive and negative utility of incoming stimuli
(Tremblay and Schultz, 2000; Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005;
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Wallis, 2007; Volz and von
Cramon, 2009). Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) serves a broad
range of functions (Paus, 2001) such as conflict monitoring,
cognitive control (Botvinick, 2007), and regulation of autonomic
activity (Critchley, 2005). Growing evidence suggests that it
computes negative utility or cost of the undertaken actions
(Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). Although evidence suggests that
OFC andACCmay both code positive and negative utility, within
the current model, we stay with the Aston-Jones and Cohen’s
(2005) simplifying assumption that the OFC codes the positive
utility of incoming stimuli and the ACC encodes the negative
utility of engaging in a given behavior.
ACC receives multiple inputs from various brain structures:
prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, amygdala, insula and
somatosensory cortex, among others (Paus, 2001). Inputs from
the PFC relay the information on the information processing
demands associated with performing a current task (Paus, 2001).
Inputs from the parietal cortex, mainly the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ), relay the information about stimuli salience,
therefore the ACC (together with the TPJ, insula and locus
coeruleus) is involved in computing cue salience (Menon and
Uddin, 2010; Litt et al., 2011; Kahnt and Tobler, 2013; Kahnt
et al., 2014). In addition, inputs from the amygdala, insula and
somatosensory cortices relay information about threatening or
noxious stimuli to ACC (Bornhövd et al., 2002; Kuo et al., 2009;
Etkin et al., 2011). It is important to note that ACC activity
is modulated by a wide range of experimentally manipulated
variables, including pain, threatening stimuli, conflicting cues,
physical and cognitive effort (Shackman et al., 2011) and thus
can serve as an integrated representation of the noncognitive
context of decision processes.
Brainstem nucleus locus coeruleus is involved in regulating
arousal and attention, the sleep-wake cycle and the stress
response. It is a main source of brain norepinephrine (NE).
LC neurons respond in a tonic and phasic manner to aversive
as well as appetitive stimuli and release NE that mediates the
mobilization of energy for avoiding aversive stimulation or
obtaining a reward (Rajkowski et al., 2004; Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005; Sara and Bouret, 2012). Importantly, NE release
regulates the gain of information processing in the cortex. LC
performs this by widespread connections with most of the brain.
It has reciprocal connections with the dopaminergic system that
implicate LC in mobilization for reward processing (Varazzani
et al., 2015). Both OFC and ACC have strong reciprocal
connections with LC (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005) and OFC
may relay its information about stimulus utility via ventral
striatum (Ullsperger et al., 2014). LC is connected to FPN, where
it projects its diffuse connections which are the basis for cortex-
wide gain modulation (Eldar et al., 2013). LC is also reciprocally
connected to amygdala, which regulates LC function by
corticotrophin releasing hormone (CRH, Owens and Nemeroff,
1991). Similarly, LC is reciprocally connected to hypothalamus
(and thus to the whole hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis),
which activates it by CRH (Owens and Nemeroff, 1991).
Through a common afferent, the nucleus paragigantocellurlaris,
LC is also connected to the sympathetic-adrenal-medullary
(SAM) system and thus it is co-activated with the peripheral
effectors of the autonomic nervous system responsible for the
galvanic skin response or pupil dilation (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2011).
Cue Weight Computation and Weighted
Additive Evaluation of Alternatives
BUMSS assumes that prior to making a multi-attribute choice,
the decision maker acquires the available information in a
sequential manner. First, when a cue enters the cortex, its validity
and salience are determined by OFC and the salience network
(including the ACC), based on past associations and physical
features. If a cue is important due to its goal relevance, past
performance or physical characteristics, it elicits high activation
of OFC and ACC. OFC and ACC relay their activations to
locus coeruleus, and the phasic OFC and ACC activation elicits
phasic LC response. This LC phasic response is the neural
substrate of the momentary gain modulation that contributes
to the final cue weight computation—a process where the
incoming decision cue is weighted, i.e., deemed important and
worth further processing or deemed unimportant and worth
ignoring.
The model assumes that FPN holds the incoming cues
and integrates them into the weighted additive evaluations of
alternatives. The anterior part of the FPN, theDLPFC, is activated
by the incoming decision cues, but it is also activated by other
stimuli that might act as distracters (Khader et al., 2015). Thus,
in the current model, DLPFC activation reflects the general effort
of processing information.We assume that this activation, driven
both by relevant stimuli and distracters, is passed down to ACC,
which in turn activates LC, increasing its tonic activity. In other
words, besides taking part in the phasic responses to cues, ACC
also codes the effort of processing the information in working
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memory. We assume that with each cue incoming to the FPN,
ACC is more active. However, ACC activation may depend on
the efficiency of DLPFC in handling the cues. If an individual’s
DLPFC is efficient in maintaining stored items, then the same
number of processed cues activates ACC to a lesser extent than in
the case when DLPFC is not efficient. When DLPFC is processing
many cues simultaneously, it highly activates ACC. ACC receives
this information and also receives the information regarding
physical effort, pain, and other states of negative utility (hunger,
thirst, negative emotions, Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005), serving
as a hub for coding negative utility from different domains and
modalities.
Gain Modulation
As already mentioned, BUMSS assumes that ACC activates locus
coeruleus—with increasing ACC activation, LC tonic activity
increases. According to the adaptive gain control theory (Aston-
Jones and Cohen, 2005), the relationship between LC-NE tonic
activity and phasic gain changes is curvilinear (inverted-U).
When the LC-NE tonic activity is low, LC-NE phasic response
to cues is weak (gain increase is small). When the tonic
LC activity is moderate, its phasic response is strong (gain
increase is high), and again when the tonic activity is high,
the phasic response is low (gain increase is small). Increases
of tonic activity from low to moderate cause the increase in
gain for incoming information, whereas increases frommoderate
to high tonic activity cause decreases in gain to incoming
information.
One of the characteristic features of the FNP, important
for the current model, is lateral inhibition. It is one of the
mechanisms underlying attentional selectivity, as postulated in
several models of attention (Walley and Weiden, 1973; Itti et al.,
1998; Edin et al., 2009; Markovic et al., 2014; Mather et al.,
2015) and has been already implemented in models of value-
based choice (Louie et al., 2013; Hunt et al., 2014). Particularly,
the model by Mather et al. is important here, because it offers
an explicit mechanistic account of the attentional effects of
norepinephrine in the cortex, that are based on inhibition.
The model GANE (Glutamate Amplifies Noradrenergic Effects)
posits that norepinephrine acts together with glutamate to form
activation hot spots in the cortex that represent the stimuli
prioritized by attention. In accordance with GANE, our model
postulates that phasic gain increases mediated by LC and the
lateral inhibition within FPN modulate attentional selectivity
such that highly activated salient cues inhibit the activation of
less salient cues. Within our model, this leads to the processing
of only single, best cues and thus results in the application
of the Take The Best strategy to the multi-attribute choice
problem.
As said above, we assume that the increased ACC activity
drives LC tonic activity. And in turn, increased LC tonic
activity leads to the change in phasic LC responding. The
exact direction of this change (increase or decrease) depends
on the initial, prestimulus level of LC tonic activity (Aston-
Jones and Cohen, 2005). If the tonic LC activity is initially low,
then ACC drive will increase it to the moderate level, which
will lead to increased phasic responses to incoming decision
cues. This will lead to better gating of these cues into the
FPN and, on the psychological level, their higher impact on
the option evaluation. If the tonic LC activity is moderate,
then its further increases by ACC drive will lead to weaker
phasic responses to incoming cues, and, as a consequence,
their poorer gating into FPN and lower impact on the option
evaluation.
The current model postulates that in order to make a multi-
attribute choice, the decision maker will try to make the final
decision by integrating the cues. Cues that have high gain (are
salient), will be better represented in working memory and will
weigh more on the final evaluation of the choice options. In
contrast, cues that have low gain (are not salient), will be poorly
represented in working memory, and will weigh less on the final
evaluation of the choice options. In extreme cases, when the tonic
LC activity is very high and only the first cue is able to produce
any phasic response, and the following cues do not produce any
phasic response from LC, only one cue is represented in working
memory and is the basis for the final choice. Within the current
model, this is akin to using the lexicographic Take The Best
heuristic. Finally, the model postulates that the FPN computes
the values of the choice alternative and relays these computations
to the premotor areas and the cortico-striatal networks that
perform action selection (Bogacz and Gurney, 2007; Forstmann
et al., 2008; Gluth et al., 2013b). The model assumes that this final
stage can also be influenced by gain modulation (Equation 3), so
that under high LC activity, the difference between the valuations
of the alternatives is enhanced, further biasing the choice process
toward the alternative with the higher value (Figure 3). Given
the mechanism specified above, we can understand how various
situational factors might impact decision strategy use and lead
to the use of simple, boundedly rational heuristics. In short,
the answer is that various factors that drive ACC activity,
such as cognitive load, stress or pain, will increase tonic LC
activity and this will change the gain of cortical information
processing in the frontoparietal network that leads to selective
processing of decision cues and to one-reason decision
making.
FIGURE 3 | The relation between probability of chosing alternative 2
(d2) based on the integrated values of alternative 1 and 2 (V1, V2) that
were transformed by the softmax rule with different values of the
inverse temperature parameter β.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, to review the existing
evidence on decision strategy use, the cognitive models and
the neural underpinnings of decision strategy selection and
second, to propose an original neurocognitive model of this
process, with a particular focus on the role of noncognitive
factors in shaping strategy selection. To this end, we reviewed
the relevant literature on strategy selection and identified gaps
in our knowledge of factors influencing this process. Particularly,
only a limited number of studies took into account the impact of
emotional factors on predecisional information processing and
decision strategy use. These gaps suggest that further studies
are needed in this domain. The review of the existing models
of decision strategy selection also pointed out that most of the
existing models are top-down, that is they assume a master,
metacognitive process that selects among the decision strategies
available to the decision maker. This feature of the top-down
models leads to one well known problem: the need for a
metastrategy to select among the individual strategies which
eventually leads to the regress to infinity (e.g., Newell, 2005).
Another serious problem of the top-down frameworks is strategy
sprawl, that is constant adding of new heuristics to the repertoire
(Scheibehenne et al., 2015).
Such limitations led to the formulation of unifying models
which attempted to reduce the multiplicity of heuristics to
more general information processing mechanisms. Our model
presented in this paper is another proposal how to unify the
use of the rational, compensatory decision strategies with the
noncompensatory, one-reason decision heuristics. It is closest
to Lee and Cummins (2004) and Bergert and Nosofsky (2007)
models, however it goes beyond these models. This model
attempts to reduce the apparent variability of decision strategies
by offering a unifying mechanistic account that is rooted in
neurophysiology. Thus, it offers a mechanistic neural processing
account of decision strategy selection. Moreover, it allows for
incorporating noncognitive factors that may influence strategy
selection, such as emotional arousal, stress and effort. It does
so by explicitly linking higher level cognitive processes that
take place in cortical areas with brainstem activity, and shows
how this activity can shape decision strategies and eventually,
choices. Because the territory of how emotions impact decision
making is rather uncharted, our model also offers some of
the first mechanistic insights how these processes might be
operating.
Relations to Other Models
Our model is focused on explaining decision strategy selection.
However, it draws from other models, formulated in various
domains. In terms of computational assumptions, our model
is similar to neuroscientific models explaining option
selection in value-based choice (Louie et al., 2011, 2013;
Chau et al., 2014; Hunt et al., 2014; Tsetsos et al., 2016). Our
model shares computational assumptions with models by
Hunt et al. (2014) and Louie et al. (2013). Particularly, by
employing the softmax rule for the cue weight computation
and option selection, our model relates to the divisive
normalization process, postulated by Louie et al. (2013)
as a general brain mechanism for value computation. The
current paper shows that divisive normalization and gain
modulation can be applied to understand not only option
selection, but also decision strategy selection. In this view,
the simplification of decision strategy, from WADD to
TTB, is a consequence of normalization process coupled
with gain increase. This offers a possibility to combine the
above models of option selection with the current model of
strategy selection, in order to explain a greater range of choice
phenomena.
As for the neural implementation of these computational
processes, the findings by Chau et al. (2014); Hunt et al. (2014)
and Louie et al. (2011, 2013), suggest an important role of
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) in attribute relevance computation and
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) in integrated option
value computation. Our model is broadly consistent with these
findings. It postulates the role of ACC (part of DMPFC) and PC
in strategy selection through the computation of attribute weight
and integration of attribute values into an overall option value. In
light of such results, our model could be refined to postulate IPS
as a node for attribute weight computation.
Our model offers a possibility to understand how the process
of strategy selection is shaped by the affective context, which can
be conceptualized as the impact of arousal on strategy selection
and which has been observed in our previous studies (Wichary
and Rieskamp, 2011; Wichary et al., 2015a). To explain this
phenomenon, our model explicitly postulates an important role
of the brainstem neuromodulatory locus coeruleus in strategy
selection. In this, it draws from the adaptive gain control theory
(AGT) and from the anatomical and neurophysiological work
on the norepinephrine system (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005).
It also draws from the recent GANE model of the effects of
norepinehrine and glutamate on information processing in the
cortex (Mather et al., 2015), which might be viewed as a detailed
extension of the AGT.
BUMSS connects these models with traditional models of
choice, present in the decision making and economic literature,
namely the weighted additive evaluation (e.g., Keeney and
Raiffa, 1993). This link is possible through conceptualizations
that are also present in Lee and Cummins (2004) and Bergert
and Nosofsky (2007) models of strategy selection, namely that
there is one mechanism unifying the use of the rational and
heuristic strategies and that this process can be related to
how decision makers weigh incoming decision cues. More
broadly, such conceptualizations are related to the general
class of evidence accumulation models. The usefulness of these
models for understanding decision strategy use has already
been noted by Newell (2005) and Bröder and Newell (2008).
Particularly, our model bears analogies to a version of evidence
accumulation model with a narrowing threshold, proposed by
Gluth et al. (2013b), where the evidence processed before a choice
accumulates to a bound that decreases over time. Based on the
evidence reviewed in this paper, we can propose a hypothesis
that changes in arousal mediated by locus coeruleus, and the
gain modulation associated with it, are the neural basis of such
a narrowing decision threshold.
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How Can the Model Be Tested?
Our model allows to go beyond the purely cognitive and
behavioral predictions regarding decision strategy use. It allows
us to link the process of strategy selection in multi-attribute
choice with the functioning of the arousal modulatory system
and its peripheral physiological indices, such as skin conductance
and pupil dilation, and with neuroimaging data, EEG and fMRI
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005, 2011; Murphy et al., 2014). Our data
(Wichary et al., 2015a) provide some indication that the relations
postulated by the current model linking skin conductance and
strategy selection are valid. Precise, computational work is
needed to reconcile these data with the predictions of the current
model. We predict that skin conductance should be correlated
with the values of β parameter in the current model fitted
to participants choice data—high skin conductance should be
associated with high values of β and thus a noncpomensatory cue
weight distribution and choices consistent with TTB heuristic.
Another peripheral signal, pupil dilation response is also a
valid index of LC function (Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Jepma and
Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Murphy et al., 2014). Our current empirical
work is focused on gathering data that link decision strategy
use in multi-attribute choice with this index. We predict that
large pupil dilations to the most valid decision cues will be
associated with high values of β parameter and a greater reliance
on the simple heuristic TTB. Also, EEG indices such as the
P300 ERP and EEG oscillatory activity are other possible indices
of LC functioning (Danysz et al., 1989; Berridge and Foote,
1991; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Our current empirical work
(Wichary et al., under review) suggests that P300 ERP component
is a viable correlate of rational and heuristic strategy use. Our
current computational work is focused on linking the predictions
of the current model with these empirical data. Last but not
least, direct measurement of LC activity with fMRI, although
technically challenging due to small size of LC, is possible
(Sasaki et al., 2006), and can be linked to choices consistent with
WADD and TTB strategies. We expect that high LC activation
evident in BOLD signal will be associated with high values of β
parameter and high proportion of choices consistent with TTB
heuristic.
Limitations of the Current Model
As any theoretical model, the model presented here is a
simplification of the truly existing relationships. Our model is
rather narrow, in that it discusses only the relation between
an extremely complex and an extremely simple strategy, the
WADD normative rule and the TTB heuristic. We chose to focus
on WADD and TTB, because empirical evidence suggests that
together, these two strategies explain a large majority of choices
in studies on multi-attribute decision-making (Rieskamp and
Hoffrage, 1999, 2008; Bröder, 2000; Newell et al., 2003; Newell
and Shanks, 2003). Importantly, we also focused on these two
strategies in order to be able to offer a detailed mechanistic
account of the process leading to strategy selection. Moreover,
our model stresses the bottom-up perspective on decision
strategy selection. This perspective assumes that attentional
processes are important for shaping decision strategy use.
However, the top-down perspective on strategy use must
not be ignored. As pointed by Kruglanski and Gigerenzer
(2011), strategy use may be shaped both by the bottom-
up and top-down processes. Future neurocognitive models
of multi-attribute choice will have to incorporate these two
perspectives.
On the neuroscience side, the model is limited in that it omits
several important anatomical structures. This is most notably
the dopaminergic (DA) system, which is implicated in coding
of positive utility, reward, and arousal, as well as in working
memory processes (Schultz, 2007; Arnsten et al., 2012). DA
system was also postulated to work together with NE system in
gain modulation (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1990), however only
recently this interplay has been fully addressed in empirical
studies (Ullsperger et al., 2014; Varazzani et al., 2015). Future
versions of the model should put more emphasis on the role of
dopamine in shaping decision strategy selection under variable
motivational circumstances.
Last but not least, the model presented here is a mathematical
and verbal sketch rather than a fully developed computational
model. As such, it requires further work, mainly translating
the process descriptions and equations into neurally plausible
computations. The ultimate goal of such a modeling exercise
is to integrate models of decision strategy use in multi-
attribute choice with models that make use of low level
neural mechanisms (e.g., Usher and Davelaar, 2002; Zhang
and Bogacz, 2010; Hunt et al., 2014). Since most traditional
models of decision making ignore the impact of noncognitive
(e.g., emotional) factors on decision making, our model is
also an initial proposal how to incorporate such factors into
models of multi-attribute choice, and thus it can contribute to
our understanding of how emotions affect our decisions. We
hope that the presented model will stimulate new empirical
investigations and theories in the neuroscience of decision
making.
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